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Intervening in the Case (or Controversy): Article III
Standing, Rule 24 Intervention, and the Conflict in the
Federal Courts
I. INTRODUCTION
Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to deciding “cases” and “controversies.”1 Federal courts ensure
compliance with Article III in part by requiring the plaintiff bringing the
lawsuit to possess standing.2 Some federal courts of appeal hold that
when an individual or entity seeks to intervene in an existing case under
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the potential intervenor
must also possess Article III standing. Other federal courts of appeal hold
that potential intervenors need not have standing because the party that
initiated the lawsuit already satisfied Article III.
While the courts and the legal scholarship have recognized the split
in the circuits,3 few conclusions have been reached as to why the circuits
are split on the issue. The lack of a clear explanation for the divergence
is not surprising; the standing doctrine is complicated. As the late Harvard Law Professor Paul Freund asserted, standing is “among the most
amorphous [issues] in the entire domain of public law.”4 The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that “Art[icle] III . . . ‘standing’ . . . is perhaps
the most important of [the Article III] doctrines.”5 Applying standing in
the context of Rule 24 intervention only adds an additional layer of complexity to the analysis. In spite of the fact that standing in the interven1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. Article III imposes other jurisdictional requirements on federal courts, such as the mandate that every claim be ripe for adjudication. In this Comment, we will address only the standing
requirement of Article III.
3. See Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 178 F.3d 538 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Joshua C. Dickinson, Note,
Standing Requirements for Intervention and the Doctrine of Legislative Standing: Will the Eighth
Circuit “Stand” by Its Mistakes in Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri & Eastern Kansas, Inc. v.
Ehlmann?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 983, 992 (1999); Amy M. Gardner, Comment, An Attempt to Intervene in the Confusion: Standing Requirements for Rule 24 Intervenors, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 681,
699–700 (2002).
4. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 1 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.13(f)(1) (3d ed. 1999).
5. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tion context has left many scholars (and, dare we say, courts) puzzled, it
is an issue of extreme importance that must be resolved.
In this Comment, we identify why the circuits reach divergent conclusions—a reason that legal scholarship has not explicitly recognized.
We argue that the courts that do not require intervenors to have Article
III standing view standing as a requirement imposed on all federal
courts, that is, that at least one party must have standing before the court
can maintain jurisdiction; conversely, the courts that do require intervenors to have Article III standing view standing as a requirement imposed
on all parties that come before a federal court. Thus, it is a subtle distinction in analytical approach that divides the circuits on this issue. We
recognize that viewing standing as a requirement on the court still necessarily depends on a party having standing; however, we argue that the
court need only ensure that the original party to bring suit has standing—
not that every party before the court has standing. Under this approach,
by ensuring that at least one of the parties before it has standing, the
court satisfies its obligation under Article III and may properly take jurisdiction.
In Part II, we trace the origins and development of both Article III
standing and Rule 24 intervention. In Part III, we analyze the case law of
the federal circuits to demonstrate that the two groups of circuit courts
approach standing in fundamentally different ways and thus reach different conclusions. In Part IV, we posit that federal courts should view
standing as a requirement on the court, and we give three principle reasons in support of this assertion. First, while the Supreme Court has not
yet answered this question, we suggest that the High Court does, in fact,
approach standing as a requirement on the court. Second, viewing standing as a requirement on a federal court is consistent with the language
and purpose of Article III. Finally, viewing standing as a requirement on
the parties produces results inconsistent with the requirements and policies of intervention. Because standing is properly viewed as a requirement on the court, we conclude that a Rule 24 intervenor need not possess Article III standing to enter an existing case,6 and we encourage

6. We note that the question whether an intervenor must possess standing to continue the
case after the original party, which had standing to bring the suit in the first place, drops out of the
proceedings is a wholly different question than that which we address in this Comment. The former
question was answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54
(1986). See infra Part IV.A for an in-depth discussion of Diamond. The question we address is
whether an intervenor must possess standing to enter a case in which the original party that had
standing to bring the suit remains in the case.
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courts to hold accordingly. In Part V, we offer a brief conclusion.
II. ARTICLE III STANDING AND RULE 24 INTERVENTION
Article III standing and Rule 24 intervention are complex issues by
themselves: standing is a constitutional doctrine but was created by the
judiciary; intervention is a rule of court but was created with legislative
authority; both doctrines contain multiple sub-requirements; and both
doctrines have changed substantially during their history. In this Part, we
will trace the development and describe the basic requirements of both
standing and intervention.
A. The Constitution and Article III Standing
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction
and judicial power of federal courts to resolving “cases” and “controversies.” This restriction ensures that only specific cases invoke the jurisdiction of federal courts so that the federal courts do not engage in answering abstract questions that are better left to the representative branches of
government.7
“Standing is a judicially-developed doctrine designed to ensure an
Article III court is presented by parties before it with an actual case or
controversy.”8 The Supreme Court holds that there are three elements to
standing: (1) there must be an actual or threatened injury; (2) the injury
must be traceable to the alleged conduct of the other party; and (3) the
injury must be redressable by a court.9 The injury is most important because it is part of all three elements of standing. To satisfy the injury requirement “a plaintiff must allege . . . that he has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendants.”10
The “case” or “controversy” requirement, and thus the standing requirement, continues throughout the pendency of the case; therefore,
federal courts must continue to insist on this requirement in order to
maintain jurisdiction. As the Eleventh Circuit stated, “It is not enough
that a real controversy existed when the lawsuit was filed, the contro-

7. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 750.
8. Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 829.
9. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
10. Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir. 1989).
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versy must be a ‘live’ controversy throughout all stages of the case.”11 In
other words, at least one party in the case must possess Article III standing at all times for the federal court’s jurisdiction to continue.
B. Congress and Rule 24 Intervention
In the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,12 Congress delegated to the Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules of procedure, practice, and evidence for all federal courts.13 The following year, the Supreme Court appointed an advisory committee to draft the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.14 Today, new rules and amendments to the rules must pass
through several layers of review and approval to become final. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules continually studies the operation of the
rules, submits proposed changes to the Judicial Conference, and drafts
explanatory committee notes to the rules.15 The public is given the opportunity to review the proposed changes, after which the rules and
amendments must be approved by the Advisory Committee, the Standing
Committee, the Judicial Conference, and finally, the Supreme Court.16
After the Supreme Court approves any amendments, it must send the
amendments to Congress for review.17 If Congress declines to reject,
modify, or defer the rules during its review period,18 the rules take effect
as a matter of law.19 The Advisory Committees are composed of federal
judges, state chief justices, law professors and lawyers with expertise in
the relevant area, and representatives of the Department of Justice.20
Thus, in addition to the fact that all Rules are created by the members of
the Advisory Committee, the final version of any Rule is explicitly approved by the Supreme Court and at least implicitly approved by Con-

11. Id. at 1202 (citing Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 362–64 (1987)).
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 2071–2077 (1934).
13. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Federal Rulemaking: The Rulemaking Process—A Summary
for the Bench and Bar, at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last updated Nov. 8,
2002). The website www.uscourts.gov is the official website of the U.S. federal court system.
14. Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655,
1658 (1995).
15. Id.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2072; Mecham, supra note 13.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2074; Mecham, supra note 13.
18. Congress is given a minimum of seven months to review the amendments. Mecham, supra note 13.
19. McCabe, supra note 14, at 1657.
20. Id. at 1664–65.
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gress.21
Rule 24 was included in the first version of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, but it has since been amended six times.22 The most recent amendments that affected subsection (a) or subsection (b) of Rule
24—the subsections relevant to our analysis—occurred in 1966, when
the provisions for intervention “as of right” were substantially modified.
Prior to 1966, intervention as of right was allowed only in very narrow
circumstances,23 but subsection (a) was modified to make the interest requirement less strict.24 Subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 24 have not been
changed since the 1966 amendments and read, in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United
States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or
fact in common.

Under the language of Rule 24, intervention as of right has three requirements: an interest related to the subject of the action, likelihood that
the interest be impaired in the intervenor’s absence, and lack of adequate
representation by the existing parties. However, courts typically condense those three requirements to two requirements: first, a potential intervenor as of right must claim a sufficient interest in the case,25 and sec-

21. Id. at 1673; Mecham, supra note 13.
22. Rule 24 was amended in 1948, 1949, 1963, 1966, 1987, and 1991.
23. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133–34 & n.3
(1967).
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note (1966) (finding the development of the
previous version of Rule 24(a) to be “unduly restricted”); Cascade Natural Gas Corp., 386 U.S. at
134 (noting that, with the 1966 amendments to Rule 24, “some elasticity was injected” into the practice of allowing intervention); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.10
(1985) (concluding that the “federal courts [that] have broadened the scope of intervention . . . heavily in favor of the applicant . . . are consistent with the thrust of the 1966 amendments”).
25. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972). A sufficient interest
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ond, that interest must not be adequately represented by existing parties.26 Permissive intervention is more straightforward: if the potential
intervenor’s claim or defense has a question of law or fact in common
with the main action, the trial court has discretion to grant or deny the
motion to intervene.27
While intervention as of right and permissive intervention have different requirements, the analysis of whether standing is required applies
equally to both types of intervention because if the Constitution requires
all parties to satisfy Article III, then all intervenors must have standing.28
With the basic stage set for Article III standing and Rule 24 intervention,
we will now explore the judicial interpretation of the interplay between
the two.
III. STANDING: A REQUIREMENT ON THE COURT OR A REQUIREMENT ON
THE PARTIES?
Eight of the federal circuits have considered whether Article III
standing is required of intervenors, and their holdings are split. This split
is a result of two different approaches to standing: some courts view
standing as a requirement on every party that comes before the court
while other courts view standing as a requirement the court must ensure
is satisfied by at least one party before it can maintain jurisdiction. The
literature and the courts themselves have failed to recognize this distinction of approach. Understanding these fundamentally different approaches to the issue will ultimately assist in resolving the conflict. This
Part catalogs the positions of the eight circuits that have decided whether
standing is required of intervenors. 29

in the case has been interpreted as a “significantly protectable interest.” Donaldson v. United States,
400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1212 (11th Cir. 1989).
26. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538; see also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 24, § 6.10 (noting
that “[a]dequacy of representation is a highly complex variable” and exploring the implications of
the issue).
27. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 24, § 6.10.
28. See Part IV.C for more discussion of the distinction between intervention as of right and
permissive intervention.
29. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have reached the issue. The remaining circuits—the First, Third, Fourth, Tenth, and Federal—
have yet to rule on the matter. Some lower courts in these circuits have produced conflicting results.
Compare Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs., 80 F. Supp. 2d 557 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (permissive intervention allowed by district court in Fourth Circuit), with West Virginia v. Moore, 902
F. Supp. 715 (S.D.W.V. 1995) (intervention denied by district court in Fourth Circuit due to lack of
standing).
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A. Circuits Viewing Standing As a Requirement
Imposed on the Court

Five federal circuits have concluded that a potential intervenor need
not possess Article III standing to come before a federal court. While
these five circuits may not explicitly identify standing as a requirement
on the court or a requirement on every party, the holdings of all five circuits demonstrate that these courts generally view standing as a requirement that every court must ensure is satisfied throughout the case by at
least one party—not as a requirement that every party must satisfy before
entering the case.
1. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit considered whether standing is required of intervenors in Ruiz v. Estelle.30 The case involved two Texas legislators who
attempted to intervene into a pending lawsuit dealing with the condition
of Texas prisons.31 The legislators argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3),
which was part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),32 afforded them the right to intervene under Rule 24.33 Section 3626 provides, in relevant part:
Any State or local official including a legislator or unit of government
whose jurisdiction or function includes the appropriation of funds for
the construction, operation, or maintenance of prison facilities, or the
prosecution or custody of persons who may be released from, or not
admitted to, a prison as a result of a prisoner release order shall have
standing to oppose the imposition or continuation in effect of such relief and to seek termination of such relief, and shall have the right to intervene in any proceeding relating to such relief.34

The court found that the legislators were within the purview of the
PLRA, and thus the legislators were granted “an unconditional right to
intervene” in the prison conditions case.35 Following this determination,
the court considered whether the PLRA violated Article III of the Constitution by granting the legislators an unconditional right to intervene

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

161 F.3d 814 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 816.
18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1996).
Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 818.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(F) (emphasis added).
Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 828.
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without standing.36
In concluding that Article III does not require potential intervenors to
have standing, the court clearly viewed standing as a requirement imposed on the court—not a requirement imposed on the parties.37 After
surveying the positions of other circuits, the court found that “the Article
III standing doctrine serves primarily to guarantee the existence of a
‘case’ or ‘controversy’ appropriate for judicial determination,”38 and
therefore, “Article III does not require each and every party in a case to
have such standing.”39 The court reasoned that “[o]nce a valid Article III
case-or-controversy is present, the court’s jurisdiction vests. The presence of additional parties, although they could not independently satisfy
Article III’s requirements, does not of itself destroy jurisdiction already
established.”40 The court viewed standing as a requirement that the
court—not all parties—had to satisfy, and once the court had satisfied the
requirement by ensuring that the original parties possessed standing, potential intervenors could enter the case by simply complying with Rule
24.41 In other words, a case or controversy had existed at the very least
since the filing of the original motions.42 Thus, the court found that the
PLRA did not violate the Constitution.43
2. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit considered the issue in United States Postal Service v. Brennan,44 where the U.S. Postal Service sued to enjoin a couple
from operating a small mail delivery business in competition with the
Postal Service.45 A labor union for postal workers, the National Association of Letter Carriers (“NALC”), sought to intervene as plaintiffs in the
case under Rule 24.46 The district court denied NALC’s motion, and the

36. Id. at 828–33.
37. See id. at 828.
38. Id. at 832 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)).
39. Id. (citing David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies,
and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 726 (1968)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 833.
43. Id.
44. 579 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1978).
45. Id. at 190.
46. Id.
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union appealed.47
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision but clarified
that intervention was denied not because NALC lacked Article III standing but rather because NALC did not satisfy the requirements of Rule
24.48 The court viewed standing as a requirement imposed on the court
that was satisfied before the question of NALC’s intervention even
arose.49 Thus the court viewed the standing analysis as separate and inapplicable to the intervention analyses: “The existence of a case or controversy having been established as between the Postal Service and the
[couple that ran the mail business], there was no need to impose the
standing requirement upon the proposed intervenor.”50
3. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit addressed the requirements imposed on an intervenor in dicta in Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry.51 In Perry,
multiple members of a trade association brought suit against the State of
Michigan in an attempt to enjoin the director of the Michigan Department of Labor from enforcing Michigan’s laws regulating trade apprenticeship programs.52 The Michigan chapter of the National Electrical
Contractors Association (“NECA”) successfully intervened in the suit.53
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment,
and the State of Michigan declined to appeal the order.54 In spite of the
fact that the State did not pursue an appeal, NECA sought to appeal the
district court’s order on its own.55 The Sixth Circuit found that “[a]n intervenor need not have the same standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit
in order to intervene in an existing district court suit where the plaintiff
has standing,” but on appeal, an intervenor “must have standing under
Article III of the Constitution entitling it to have the court decide the
merits of the dispute.”56
While the Sixth Circuit did not explicitly identify standing as a re47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 190–91.
Id. at 190.
Id.
16 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 689.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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quirement on the court, it implicitly did so by stating that “standing [is]
necessary to initiate a lawsuit.”57 Thus the court satisfied Article III by
ensuring that at least one party had standing to bring the suit, and the
court need not consider standing when parties seek to intervene into a
case in which standing has already been satisfied. However, when the
party with standing drops out of the case, as occurred in Perry, any party
that seeks to continue the case must satisfy the standing requirements.58
Because NECA could not satisfy those requirements, the court dismissed
the appeal.59
4. The Ninth Circuit
In Yniguez v. Arizona,60 the Ninth Circuit addressed a fact pattern
similar to that in Perry. In this case, a state employee sued the governor
of Arizona in an attempt to invalidate an amendment to the Arizona Constitution that made English the official language of the state.61 The district court held that the amendment was unconstitutional under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the Governor declined to appeal the decision.62 Shortly thereafter, Arizonans for Official English
(“AOE”) moved to intervene in the case in order to appeal the judgment.63 The district court denied the motion, and AOE appealed.64
The court cited Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt65 in interpreting
the intervention rule: “Rule 24(a) . . . require[s] the granting of a motion
to intervene at the outset of litigation if four criteria are met: (1) timeliness; (2) an interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (3) absent intervention the party’s interest may be practically impaired; (4) other parties inadequately represent the intervenor.”66 The court then made clear
that a potential intervenor did not need to satisfy any other requirements:
“In order for an individual to intervene in ongoing litigation between

57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 693.
60. 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 729.
62. Id. at 730. The Governor’s decision not to appeal was not surprising. Governor Rose
Mofford publicly opposed the adoption of English as Arizona’s official language in her election
campaign of 1988. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983).
66. Yniguez, 939 F.2d at 731 (citing Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 527).
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other parties, he need only meet the Sagebrush Rebellion criteria.”67 The
court indicated that standing was not required for intervention by contrasting intervention in “an ongoing litigation between other parties”—
where only the Sagebrush Rebellion requirements need to be met—with
intervention in a case that was no longer ongoing: “where no party appeals, the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III also qualifies
an applicant’s right to intervene post-judgment.”68 The court extended
this reasoning to a logical conclusion: “[A]n interest strong enough to
permit intervention with parties at the onset of an action under Rule 24(a)
is not necessarily a sufficient basis for intervention after judgment for the
purpose of pursuing an appeal which all parties have abandoned.”69
Thus, while AOE likely could have intervened in the district court case
without satisfying Article III standing requirements, it was not permitted
to appeal the district court’s judgment by itself without possessing Article III standing.70
The Ninth Circuit evidently did not view standing as a doctrine imposed on all parties because in Yniguez, the court would not require a potential intervenor to have standing if attempting to intervene into a case
in which an original party has already satisfied standing.71 Indeed, the
court’s conclusion that an intervenor attempting to appeal on its own
must have standing is consistent with the view that standing is a requirement imposed on the court. Specifically, the court lost its “case or controversy” when the party with standing declined to appeal. Therefore,
the case could not proceed until the intervenor satisfied the standing requirement and restored the “case or controversy.”
5. The Eleventh Circuit
In Chiles v. Thornburgh,72 a U.S. senator sued multiple Florida state
officials challenging as illegal the operation of a detention facility.73 A
group of detainees attempted to intervene as of right, but the district
court denied the motion.74 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id at 734. It should be noted that the court found that AOE did have standing to continue
the case. Id.
71. Id. at 731.
72. 865 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1989).
73. Id. at 1200–01.
74. Id.
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court and found that the detainees were entitled to intervene as a matter
of right.75 In considering the detainees’ motion to intervene, the court
found that “standing concerns the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court,” and that “[i]ntervention under Rule 24 presumes that there is a
justiciable case into which an individual wants to intervene.”76 Thus, the
court approached standing as a separate requirement from intervention,
and as such, it saw standing as a requirement the court had to satisfy before it ever considered the motion to intervene.77 Its conclusion was
therefore expected: “We therefore hold that a party seeking to intervene
need not demonstrate that he has standing in addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 24 as long as there exists a justiciable case and controversy between the parties already in the lawsuit.”78
Despite this holding, the Chiles court did find the standing cases
helpful to the intervention analysis in one aspect: “The focus . . . of a
Rule 24 inquiry is whether the intervenor has a legally protectable interest in the litigation. It is in this context that the standing cases are relevant, for an intervenor’s interest must be a particularized interest rather
than a general grievance.”79 Thus, according to the court, the standing
analysis is relevant to the intervention analysis.80 Whether the Eleventh
Circuit equates the intervention interest to the standing interest is not
clear, but there is some indication that the court considers the two interests to be identical.81 While the court’s usage of the standing analysis to
define the interest required for intervention is by no means conventional,
it did not harm the logic of its conclusion that standing is not required of
intervenors. Even assuming that the Eleventh Circuit effectively requires
standing of intervenors as of right (by equating the two interests), the
Chiles court did not require any such interest of permissive intervenors.82
In considering whether another group of potential intervenors satisfied
the requirements of Rule 24, the court stated that a party seeking to inter-

75. Id. at 1215.
76. Id. at 1212.
77. Id. at 1213.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1212 (footnote omitted) (citing Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956 (11th Cir.
1986)).
80. Id. at 1213.
81. The Chiles court analogized the interest of the intervening detainees to “prisoners who
have standing to sue over the conditions of the institution where they are detained.” Id. at 1214. Thus
the detainees’ interest likely would also satisfy Article III standing.
82. Id.
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vene permissively need only show that his application is timely and that
his claim or defense has a question of law or fact in common with the
main action.83 At that point, a district court has discretion to grant or
deny the motion.84 By not requiring any interest at all of permissive intervenors, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed its position that the Constitution
does not require potential intervenors to have Article III standing.85
B. Circuits Viewing Standing As a Requirement
Imposed on All Parties
In contrast to the five circuits discussed above, three federal circuits
have concluded that a potential intervenor must have Article III standing
to enter a case. As we show in this section, these circuits generally view
standing as a requirement that every party must satisfy throughout the
case—not as a requirement that the court may satisfy by finding that at
least one party has standing.
1. The District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit was the first circuit to expressly require Article III standing of potential intervenors.86 This circuit first suggested that conclusion in Southern Christian Leadership Conference v.
Kelley,87 where a U.S. senator sought to intervene in two cases dealing
with the FBI’s surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.88 Facing a
vote to make Dr. King’s birthday a national holiday, the senator attempted to obtain access to FBI tapes of Dr. King that became sealed
upon a court order.89
The D.C. Circuit found that “Rule 24(a)(2) requires [an] intervenor
to demonstrate . . . a legally protectable [interest].”90 The court then
stated that “[s]uch a gloss upon [Rule 24] is in any case required by Article III of the Constitution.”91 In addition, the court expressed in a foot-

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t. v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994); S.
Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
87. 747 F.2d 777 (1984).
88. Id. at 778.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 779 (citing Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971)).
91. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)).
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note that it explicitly found the senator “lacked a protectable interest and
thus lacked standing.”92 In spite of the court’s apparent finding that the
senator lacked standing, its holding is arguably narrower. The court’s
finding that the senator lacked any protectable interest was sufficient to
deny the motion to intervene, since Rule 24 does require some protectable interest.93 Thus the court’s language about standing arguably can be
viewed as dicta.
Even though one D.C. Circuit case acknowledged Kelley as holding
that intervenors must satisfy Article III standing as well as the requirements of Rule 24,94 some dispute regarding the circuit’s position on the
matter later arose and was recognized in Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.95 In Rio Grande, a pipeline
company sought review of a decision by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) that denied a request by the company to include
the cost of pipeline in its rate base.96 A third-party pipeline company that
had received a similar denial attempted to intervene in the suit under 28
U.S.C. § 2348.97 The lower court denied the motion, and the company
appealed.98
In considering whether intervenors require standing, the D.C. Circuit
found that two lower courts had “produc[ed] precedent that can be read
as in direct conflict” with each other—one case supporting the imposition of a standing requirement on intervenors and one case opposing such
a requirement.99 The court followed Kelley’s holding that intervenors
must have standing.100 In arriving at that conclusion, the court viewed
Article III standing as a doctrine applicable to every party coming before
a federal court rather than to every federal court hearing a case. In Rio
Grande, the court looked to the rationale underlying the Kelley decision:

92. Id. at 781 n.3.
93. Id.
94. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t. v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing
Kelley as support for the proposition that “we have held that because an intervenor participates on
equal footing with the original parties to a suit, a movant for leave to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2)
must satisfy the same Article III standing requirements as original parties”).
95. 178 F.3d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
96. Id. at 535.
97. Id. at 537.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 537–38. The two cases are, respectively, City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 17 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and American Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 26 F.3d 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
100. Rio Grande, 178 F.3d at 538.
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“[B]ecause a Rule 24 intervenor seeks to participate on an equal footing
with the original parties to the suit, he must satisfy the standing requirements imposed on those parties.”101 The court concluded that “[b]ecause
a prospective § 2348 intervenor similarly seeks to participate like a
party, . . . it should be treated like a party. Accordingly, as we had held in
Kelley, it must satisfy the standing requirements imposed on parties.”102
Thus any notions that the D.C. Circuit might allow intervention without
standing were dispelled.
2. The Eighth Circuit
In the Eighth Circuit case Mausolf v. Babbit,103 multiple snowmobile
enthusiasts brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior and others to
enjoin the enforcement of snowmobiling restrictions in Voyageurs National Park.104 The Voyageurs Region National Park Association and
other conservationist groups moved to intervene under Rule 24.105 The
Park Association sought to secure vigorous enforcement of the restrictions on snowmobiling in the Park, and the Eighth Circuit,106 while holding that the Park Association had standing and satisfied the requirements
of Rule 24(a), concluded that an intervenor must satisfy Article III standing.107
In considering whether the Park Association needed Article III standing to intervene, the Eighth Circuit first noted that “Rule 24(a) says nothing about standing.”108 The court then surveyed the “diverse, sometimes
‘anomalous’ approaches”109 taken by the federal courts of appeals and
concluded that it could not identify a “majority view” on the question.110
Faced with the Park Association’s argument that Article III only required
the original parties to have standing, the court nevertheless found that
Article III required all parties in the case to have standing: “In our view,
an Article III case or controversy, once joined by intervenors who lack
standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an Article III case or contro101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting City of Cleveland, 17 F.3d at 1517).
Id. (emphasis added).
85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1296.
Id.
Id. at 1296–97.
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1299.
Id. (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986)).
Id. at 1299.
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versy.”111 The court demonstrated that it viewed standing as a requirement on the parties, and it stated this view in much more explicit language than other circuits that agree: “An Article III case or controversy is
one where all parties have standing, and a would-be intervenor, because
he seeks to participate as a party, must have standing as well.”112
3. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit’s treatment of standing in the intervention context has not been consistent, and questions still remain as to that circuit’s
position on the issue. In United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land,113 the Secretary of the Interior attempted to acquire property on Lake Michigan in
a condemnation action.114 A not-for-profit corporation sought to protect
the property for public use by intervening in the case.115 In affirming the
district court’s decision to disallow the corporation from intervening, the
Seventh Circuit did not determine whether the corporation needed standing to intervene.116 Rather, the court found that “[t]he interest of a proposed intervenor . . . must be greater than the interest sufficient to satisfy
the standing requirement.”117
Based on this standard, a court would not need to determine if an intervenor should comply with Article III standing because any party that
satisfied the interest requirement of intervention would necessarily satisfy the interest requirement of standing. Likewise, any party that did not
satisfy the interest requirement of intervention would be denied intervention, making the question of standing irrelevant. By making compliance
with the intervention interest more difficult than compliance with the
standing interest, the 36.96 Acres court effectively rendered moot the
question of whether standing is required of intervenors. Under the 36.96
Acres court’s reasoning, the Seventh Circuit would never need to decide
if standing is required of intervenors.118
Eleven years after 36.96 Acres, the Seventh Circuit revisited the is-

111. Id. at 1300.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985).
114. Id. at 857.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 859.
117. Id.
118. Alternatively, a court could use the 36.96 Acres decision to avoid deciding whether a
party had an interest sufficient to intervene. If it concluded that the party did not satisfy Article III
standing, it would not need to consider the interest required to intervene.

116

BYE-PP3

nnn]

10/21/2003 9:36:00 AM

Intervening in the Case (or Controversy)

sue and decided that all intervenors must satisfy Article III standing.119
In Solid Waste Agency, several Illinois municipalities brought suit challenging the denial of a permit to build a landfill near the town of Bartlett,
Illinois.120 The residents of Bartlett moved to intervene under Rule 24 to
keep the landfill from being built.121
In considering whether the Bartlett residents should be allowed to intervene, the court discussed a hypothetical property owner whose property right might be destroyed as the result of a lawsuit by an environmental agency.122 The court noted that “[t]he threatened injury would
give [the property owner] the minimal standing required by Article III,
which our court requires of any intervenor.”123 In support of its conclusion, the court cited its own 36.96 Acres decision,124 even though that
case simply stood for the proposition that the intervention interest is
greater than the standing interest.125 However, the Solid Waste Agency
court made its assertion clear by stating that “[s]ome other courts do not
require [Article III standing in the intervention context]”126 and citing
the Sixth Circuit’s Perry decision, which held that an intervenor need not
have the same interest necessary to initiate a lawsuit in order to intervene
in a suit where the plaintiff has standing.127 The Solid Waste Agency
court further bolstered its inclusion of standing in the requirements for
intervention by reasoning that a “would-be intervenor [should] not be
permitted to push out the already wide boundaries of Article III standing.”128 The court denied the Bartlett residents’ motion to intervene as of
right.129 Regardless of whether it interpreted its earlier 36.96 Acres decision correctly, the Solid Waste Agency court was clear in declaring that
the Seventh Circuit requires standing of all intervenors as of right.130
The Solid Waste Agency court’s treatment of the Bartlett residents’

119. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101
F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1996).
120. Id. at 504.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 507.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985).
125. Id. at 859.
126. Solid Waste Agency, 101 F.3d at 507.
127. Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1994).
128. Solid Waste Agency, 101 F.3d at 507.
129. Id. at 509.
130. Id. at 507.
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motion to intervene permissively131 is problematic. The court reprimanded the district court for denying intervention based on the residents’
lack of a sufficient interest because, according to the Seventh Circuit,
“‘interest’ does not appear in Rule 24(b). All that is required for permissive intervention, so far as bears on this case, is that the applicant have a
claim or defense in common with a claim or defense in the suit.”132 Because the district court misapplied the law, the Seventh Circuit remanded
the case for proper consideration of permissive intervention.133 This part
of Solid Waste Agency is highly problematic because if the court were
correct in asserting that Article III applies to all intervenors as of right,
then Article III must logically also apply to all permissive intervenors.134
The court’s treatment of permissive intervention seems to indicate that
when it considered intervention as of right, it meant to conclude, like the
36.96 Acres court did, that the interest required for intervention as of
right is simply a greater interest than the interest required for standing.135
Whatever the intention, the Solid Waste Agency court left the Seventh
Circuit’s position on standing in the intervention context far from clear.
The Seventh Circuit declined to untangle the issue four years later in
Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Babbit,136 where several American
Indian tribes attempted to convert a racing track into a casino and gaming
facility.137 The American Indian tribes’ application was denied, and the
tribes sought review of the decision.138 Another American Indian tribe,
the St. Croix Indians, sought to intervene as defendants because the St.
Croix operated existing gambling facilities in the same area in which the
other Indian groups wanted to start their casino.139
In denying the St. Croix’s motion to intervene, the court again considered standing in the context of intervention.140 The court observed
that “[f]rom a pragmatic standpoint, . . . ‘[a]ny interest of such magnitude
[as to support Rule 24(a) intervention as of right] is sufficient to satisfy
131. Id. at 509.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See discussion infra Part IV.C (reasoning that if the Constitution applies to any intervenors, it must apply to all intervenors, whether as of right or permissive).
135. Solid Waste Agency, 101 F.3d at 507; see also United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754
F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985).
136. 214 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2000).
137. Id. at 943.
138. Id. at 945.
139. Id. at 943.
140. Id. at 946.
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the Article III standing requirement as well.’”141 However, the court
concluded by dodging the issue: “Because it is enough here to decide
[that] the St. Croix has [not] satisfied the requirements of the rule, we do
not explore further what the outer boundaries of standing to intervene
might be.”142 Thus the Sokaogon court did not determine whether the
Seventh Circuit requires intervenors to have standing.
In summary, 36.96 Acres, Solid Waste Agency, and Sokaogon are all
consistent with the notion that the Seventh Circuit requires intervenors as
of right to have an interest that is greater than the interest required in the
standing analysis, but beyond that statement, little is clear. The Seventh
Circuit must still deal with Solid Waste Agency’s inconsistent assertions
that standing is required of intervenors as of right and that no interest is
required of permissive intervenors.
Whether the Seventh Circuit views standing as a requirement on the
court or a requirement on the parties is difficult to determine, considering
the circuit’s complicated analysis of the issue. Because 36.96 Acres and
Sokaogon simply stated that a potential intervenor’s interest must be
greater than the standing interest, those courts’ approach to standing is
inconclusive. Solid Waste Agency’s language offers evidence supporting
both approaches. In stating that “our court requires [Article III standing]
of any intervenor,” the court viewed standing as a requirement on the
parties.143 However, by concluding that permissive intervention does not
require any interest at all, the court shied away from the view that standing applied to parties and left open the conclusion that standing was already satisfied in the case before the permissive intervention.
IV. STANDING IS PROPERLY VIEWED AS A REQUIREMENT THE COURT
MUST ENSURE IS SATISFIED
We argue that standing should be approached as a requirement on
every federal court—not as a requirement on every party coming before
a federal court. This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court’s approach to standing in an intervention context as well as the language and
purpose of Article III. In addition, viewing standing as a requirement on
all parties produces results inconsistent with Rule 24 intervention.

141. Id. (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 125 F.3d 392, 396 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997)).
142. Id.
143. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101
F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1996).
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A. Supreme Court Treatment of Standing in the
Context of Intervention
The Supreme Court has not explicitly decided whether Rule 24 intervenors must possess Article III standing.144 The Court has, however,
addressed a closely related issue, and in that context, the Court provided
guidance to the resolution of standing in the framework of intervention.
Diamond v. Charles145 is the most relevant Supreme Court case regarding standing in the intervention context. While the Court did not address whether an intervenor must have standing to enter an ongoing case
at the trial court level, the Court did discuss standing and intervention at
the appellate level.146 Although Diamond has been read to support either
conclusion,147 we argue that the proper reading of Diamond indicates
that standing is a requirement on the court, not on every party. In-depth
consideration of Diamond is thus appropriate.
In 1979, the Illinois Legislature amended its abortion law to increase
state regulations regarding abortions.148 The law imposed criminal liability on persons that performed abortions in certain circumstances; in other
circumstances, the law required physicians to provide women with information related to abortions.149 Upon passage of the amendments to
the abortion law, seven physicians and two abortion clinics filed a class
action suit against the State of Illinois seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of the abortion law.150 Another physician, Eugene F. Diamond, moved to
intervene in the case as a party defendant based on his “conscientious objection to abortions” as well as on his “status as a pediatrician and as a

144. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68–69, 69 n.21 (1986) (recognizing that “[t]he Courts
of Appeals have reached varying conclusions as to whether a party seeking to intervene as of right
must himself possess standing” but concluding that “[w]e need not decide today whether a party
seeking to intervene before a District Court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2),
but also the requirements of Art. III”).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 62–71.
147. Compare Solid Waste Agency, 101 F.3d at 507 (acknowledging that Diamond did not
resolve the conflict, asserting that “there is less to it than meets the eye, since Diamond makes clear
that a case must be dismissed if the only party on one side of the suit is an intervenor who lacks
standing,” and concluding that standing is required of all intervenors), with Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d
814, 830–31 (5th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that the Diamond Court’s discussion of the standing
interest and the intervention interest “created confusion” among the circuits and asserting that Diamond supports a conclusion that standing is not required of intervenors).
148. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 56.
149. Id. at 57 n.3.
150. Id. at 57.
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parent of an unemancipated minor daughter.”151 The district court
granted Diamond’s motion to intervene.152
After a series of preliminary injunctions and appeals, the district
court permanently enjoined the enforcement of several sections of the
abortion law.153 After the Seventh Circuit affirmed the permanent injunction, the State of Illinois chose not to appeal the decision, but Diamond did file a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court.154 The Court
found that Diamond did not possess Article III standing, and with no
“case” or “controversy,” the Court dismissed Diamond’s appeal.155 In
more generic terms, the Supreme Court held that an intervenor that lacks
standing may not appeal a judgment if no party that possesses standing
chooses to appeal the decision.156 In so concluding, the Court viewed the
standing doctrine as a requirement on the court—not as a requirement on
every party to come before the court.
The Court first acknowledged that Article III “limits the power of
federal courts to deciding ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”157 The Court then
discussed the policy of requiring the complaining party to have suffered
an injury to prevent federal courts from becoming involved in the “vindication of value interests” or the resolving of vague concerns.158 Turning
to the facts of the case, the Court stated, “Had the State of Illinois invoked this Court’s appellate jurisdiction . . . and sought review of the
Court of Appeals’ decision, the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ requirement
would have been met, for a State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute.”159 In other words, the Court reasoned that once one
party possessing standing had appealed, Article III would be satisfied.
The Court made clear that Article III applies to the court by declaring
that “[the State of Illinois’s] failure to invoke our jurisdiction leaves the
Court without a ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”160
The Court went so far as to note that, even though Diamond did not
have standing, Diamond could have appealed if the State of Illinois had

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59–61.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 62 (quoting United States v. Scrap, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
Id.
Id. at 63–64 (emphasis added).
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also appealed because Article III would already be satisfied.161 In a telling passage, the Court hypothesized:
Had the State sought review, this Court’s [r]ule . . . makes clear that
Diamond, as an intervening defendant below, also would be entitled to
seek review, enabling him to file a brief on the merits, and to seek leave
to argue orally. But this ability to ride “piggyback” on the State’s undoubted standing exists only if the State is in fact an appellant before
the Court; in the absence of the State in that capacity, there is no case
for Diamond to join.162

The Court clearly viewed the two analyses—standing analysis and
intervention analysis—as distinct; if the State had appealed, the Court’s
Article III standing obligation would have been satisfied, and it could
have maintained jurisdiction.163 Only after its jurisdiction was certain
could it properly enter into an analysis of intervention. Therefore if the
State had appealed, Diamond would have been entitled to remain in the
proceedings also, even though he clearly lacked standing. Only when
there is no party before the court that possesses standing is there “no case
for Diamond to join.”164 In further evidence of the Court’s approach to
standing as a requirement on a federal court, the Court stated that “Diamond’s status as an intervenor below, whether permissive or as of right,
does not confer standing sufficient to keep the case alive in the absence
of the State on this appeal.”165 The Court put standing in its proper perspective—as a requirement on the court to keep the case alive—not as a
requirement on every party.
B. The Policy of Article III Standing
We do not discount the important purpose of Article III standing,
which is to ensure that federal courts do not engage in making abstract
policy decisions. However, the policy behind Article III indicates that
standing is a requirement on the federal courts—not a requirement on all
who seek to come before those courts. If, at the outset, a federal court has
correctly determined that it has an actual concrete “case” or “controversy” before it, the purpose of Article III is not frustrated by allowing
intervenors to subsequently participate in the proceedings.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
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The policy that guided the judiciary in creating the doctrine of Article III standing was largely a concern for separation of powers between
the three branches of government. If the federal courts are not limited to
hearing only “cases” and “controversies,” then there is no assurance that
they will not engage in making abstract policy decisions that are better
left to the representative branches of government. In Frothingham v.
Mellon,166 an early case dealing with standing, the Supreme Court explained:
The functions of government under our system are apportioned. To the
legislative department has been committed the duty of making laws, to
the executive the duty of executing them, and to the judiciary the duty
of interpreting and applying them in cases properly brought before the
courts. The general rule is that neither department may invade the province of the other and neither may control, direct, or restrain the action
of the other. . . . We have no power per se to review and annul acts of
Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional.167

The Court further explained that it may only review an act of Congress if there is “some direct injury” to a particular party.168 The injury
requirement ensures that the court is addressing a specific wrong rather
than making an abstract policy decision as to whether a law enacted by
Congress was appropriate. Standing, therefore, is best viewed as a requirement on federal courts to make certain they are acting within their
separable power.169
Admittedly, the party bringing the action has the burden of persuading the federal court that the court has the authority to hear the case. That
burden, however, does not fall upon all parties. As the Supreme Court in
Frothingham stated, “The party who invokes the power [(the jurisdiction
of the court)] must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid,
but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
166. Frothingham was consolidated with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
167. Id. at 488.
168. Id.
169. See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Flast Court expounded on the separation of powers:
Embodied in the words “cases” and “controversies” are two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned
to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.
Id. at 94–95.

123

BYE-PP3

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/21/2003 9:36:00 AM

[2003

direct injury as the result of its enforcement . . . .”170 By expressly distinguishing which party bears the burden, the Court implicitly indicated
that it is not a burden that all parties coming before it must bear. When
the party invoking the power of the court satisfies the standing requirement, that party has already established the jurisdiction of the court for
that particular “case” or “controversy.” Once the court’s jurisdiction is
established, it is difficult to imagine how allowing others to participate in
the proceedings would change a concrete “case” or “controversy” into an
abstract policy question that federal courts are forbidden to hear. Even
with other participants in the proceedings, the court would still only be
deciding one specific case.
A comparison of standing to supplemental jurisdiction is particularly
illustrative of the fact that once Article III is satisfied, a court’s jurisdiction is vested. In a helpful footnote in Ruiz v. Estelle,171 the Fifth Circuit
observed that in the supplemental jurisdiction context, “the presence of
additional claims which could not have been filed in federal court does
not necessarily divest a federal court of jurisdiction so long as the Article
III requirements remain intact.”172 Similarly, once the court establishes
jurisdiction through the standing of the original parties, the court can
hear the intervenor’s case, even though the intervenor lacks standing, “so
long as the Article III requirements remain intact,” or, in other words, so
long as the original parties continue in the proceedings or the intervenor
can meet the standing requirements independently.173
The policy of Article III standing to ensure that federal courts do not
overstep their apportioned function indicates that standing is a requirement on federal courts and not a requirement on every applicant that

170. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added); see supra note 166; see also Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)
(“[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to [show
standing].”); Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39
(1885) (“[The Supreme Court] has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the
United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.”).
171. 161 F.3d 814 (5th Cir. 1998).
172. Id. at 833 n.27 (citations omitted).
173. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986). Though standing is a requirement on the
court that is satisfied at the outset of a particular case, it is a requirement that must be maintained
throughout the proceedings of the case. See, e.g., Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1202 (11th
Cir. 1989). Hence, if the original parties on which the court relied to satisfy Article III drop out of
the proceedings, the court will be required to ensure that what is left constitutes a “case” or “controversy” in order to continue the proceedings. In Diamond, the Court was unable to maintain jurisdiction without the original parties that invoked such jurisdiction.
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seeks to influence the outcome of a particular case.
C. Viewing Standing As a Requirement on All Parties
Is Inconsistent with Rule 24
In this Part, we argue that approaching standing as a requirement on
all parties produces results inconsistent with the language and purpose of
Rule 24. We certainly realize that if a requirement is imposed by the
Constitution, then a Rule of Civil Procedure—or anything else, save a
constitutional amendment, for that matter—cannot override it. Furthermore, that a constitutional requirement conflicts with the language and
purpose of a rule only indicates that the rule is out of harmony with the
intent of the Constitution—not vice versa. We do not suggest here that a
Rule of Civil Procedure trumps the Constitution; rather, we suggest that
the process by which rules are created provides evidence of the proper
interpretation of Article III. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
drafted by the Advisory Committee, which is composed of judges,
prominent lawyers, and law professors. The Supreme Court approves the
rules, and Congress is given an opportunity to reject the rules. Thus the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represent the view of the Advisory
Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress. While the rules are
clearly not an official interpretation of the Constitution, they were not
drafted nor are they amended on a whim.174 Thus, the conclusion of
these groups—the rule itself—is at least persuasive evidence as to the
groups’ likely interpretation of the law.
The circuits that require standing of intervenors generally reason
that, as the Eighth Circuit put it, “an Article III case or controversy, once
joined by intervenors who lack standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an
Article III case or controversy.”175 The courts that have required standing of intervenors typically have done so in the context of Rule 24(a),
which deals with intervention as of right. However, the logic of that position also requires that permissive intervenors under Rule 24(b) possess
Article III standing. If the Constitution demands standing of all parties
that come before a federal court, then all intervenors—whether as of
right or permissive—must possess Article III standing. Adopting the position that standing applies to both intervenors as of right and permissive
intervenors, however, necessarily produces three results that are inconsis-

174. See supra Part II.B (reviewing the rigorous amendment process).
175. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996).
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tent with Rule 24. First, the requirement in Rule 24(a) that intervenors as
of right possess an interest in the outcome of the case is rendered meaningless. Second, the requirement in Rule 24(b) that permissive intervenors have a claim or defense with a question of law or fact in common
with the main action is also rendered meaningless. Third, the distinction
between Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b) becomes practically useless.
1. Rule 24(a)’s “interest” requirement
If standing is interpreted as a requirement on all parties, the language
in Rule 24(a) requiring an interest in the outcome of the action is superfluous. If a party has such an interest in the case to satisfy standing, it
automatically satisfies the intervention interest. This assertion presupposes that the standing interest is greater than or equal to the intervention
interest. Thus, defining the interest levels of Rule 24 and the standing
doctrine is necessary.
While the standing interest has been fairly well defined, the interest
required for intervention could certainly use clarification by the
courts.176 In short, courts have reached very different conclusions regarding the level of interest required by Rule 24(a). However, all that is necessary for our purposes is that we establish that the standing interest is
equal to or greater than the intervention interest. First, we note that every
circuit except one that has considered the level of interest required by intervention has concluded either that the intervention interest is less than
the standing interest or that the intervention interest and the standing interest are equal. Only the Seventh Circuit has held that the intervention
interest is a greater interest than the standing interest,177 but that circuit’s
interpretation is likely improper under dicta in Diamond. In Diamond,178
the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Diamond, the physician who
supported enforcement of the Illinois abortion law, because he lacked
standing to continue the case.179 In considering what interest Diamond
possessed, the Court found that “Diamond’s status as an intervenor below, whether permissive or as of right, does not confer standing suffi-

176. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 24, § 6.10.
177. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 125 F.3d 392, 396 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that
“[a]ny interest of such magnitude [so as to satisfy Rule 24(a)] is sufficient to satisfy the Article III
standing requirement as well”); United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985)
(same).
178. Diamond, 476 U.S. 54.
179. Id. at 68.
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cient to keep the case alive in the absence of the State on this appeal.”180
In other words, even if Diamond had met the requirements to intervene
as of right, he would not necessarily possess standing. The Court certainly could have found that an intervenor as of right possesses sufficient
interest so as to necessarily confer standing, but instead it found that the
status of an intervenor as of right does not confer standing on the
party.181 While the Court did not expressly hold that the intervention interest is less than the standing interest, it appeared to view standing as
more stringent than intervention.182
Furthermore, even assuming that the Supreme Court had not discussed the issue in dicta or otherwise, it makes little sense to make the
intervention interest more stringent than the standing interest because if a
party has standing, it can bring its own suit. To suggest that with intervention Congress intended to make it more difficult for a party to join a
case than to initiate its own case wholly ignores not only the language of
Rule 24(a), but also the Advisory Committee’s notes encouraging courts
to apply intervention liberally.183 Simply put, viewing standing as a requirement on the parties renders meaningless Rule 24(a)’s requirement
of an interest in the outcome of the case.
2. Rule 24(b)’s “question in common” requirement
If standing is interpreted as a requirement on all parties, the language
in Rule 24(b) requiring a claim or defense with a question of fact or law
in common with the main action is rendered even more superfluous than
the language in Rule 24(a). Under the same reasoning, the interest required by Rule 24(b) is certainly less than the standing interest. In fact,
no courts raise the interest for permissive intervention to the level of the
standing interest based solely on the language of Rule 24(b). Thus, imposing standing on potential permissive intervenors as a matter of consti-

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. This conclusion is consonant with the advisory committee’s 1966 amendment to the Rule
allowing for intervention more liberally.
183. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note (1966) (finding the development of the
previous version of Rule 24(a) to be “unduly restricted”); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 134 (1967) (noting that, with the 1966 amendments to Rule 24,
“some elasticity was injected” into the practice of allowing intervention); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 24, § 6.10 (concluding that the “federal courts [that] have broadened the scope of
intervention . . . heavily in favor of the applicant . . . are consistent with the thrust of the 1966
amendments”).
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tutional law effectively invalidates the “question in common” language
of Rule 24(b).
3. The distinction between the language of Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b)
Approaching standing as a requirement on all parties virtually nullifies the distinction between subsection (a) and subsection (b) of Rule 24
as a practical matter. If Rule 24(a)’s protectable interest is less than or
equal to the standing interest, then Rule 24(b)’s requirement of a claim or
defense with a question of law or fact in common is certainly less stringent than the standing interest. That Congress employed such different
language in the two subsections of Rule 24 suggests that different meanings were intended. The two subsections of the rule are parallel in structure, and the language preceding each of those phrases is virtually identical. Subsection (a) begins as follows:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest . . . .184

The comparable portion of subsection (b) states:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right
to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common.185

The emphasized portion of each subsection above demonstrates that
subsection (a) and subsection (b) are identical—with the exception of the
words “shall” and “may”—until the point at which they identify what interest is required to intervene. At that point, subsection (a) and subsection (b) differ dramatically. Such a dramatic change of verbiage in the
two subsections could not have been coincidental; if the drafters intended
the interest requirement to be the same in both subsections, they would
not have used such different language. Thus, the structure of Rule 24
strongly indicates that the drafters intended a different interest for per-

184. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (emphasis added).
185. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (emphasis added).
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missive intervention than for intervention as of right. If standing is required of all parties, the two interest requirements are equated—they
both would have to rise to the level of standing.
In addition to the fact that requiring standing of intervenors nullifies
the distinction between permissive intervention and intervention as of
right, requiring standing of intervenors will also greatly narrow the scope
of applicability of Rule 24(b) and will almost completely eliminate the
need for Rule 24. If standing is a requirement of both methods of intervention, then an applicant with standing may intervene as of right if the
parties in court do not adequately represent its interests. Furthermore, an
applicant with standing that seeks to intervene permissively need not
show anything; its standing will ensure that it has a question of law or
fact in common. The applicant may intervene merely if the court grants it
permission to do so. The consequences of this analysis are as follows:
first, an applicant without Article III standing will never be permitted to
intervene in a case; second, applicants with standing are highly unlikely
to enter the case permissively because intervention as of right only requires an applicant with standing to demonstrate that its interests are not
adequately represented. This standard is not a high one, and courts infrequently deny intervention based on adequate representation. Thus, an applicant will only be able to intervene permissively when it has standing,
when its interests are fully represented in court, and when the district
court judge is nevertheless willing to permit the applicant to enter the
case. This combination of factors will not occur often, and it is unlikely
that the Rule 24 drafters intended this result in including the possibility
of permissive intervention.
Interpreting standing as a requirement on the parties is not consistent
with the language and policy of Rule 24 intervention, but again, we readily acknowledge that this fact does not foreclose the issue. We argue,
however, that the illogical result of that approach is at least persuasive
evidence that the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress
enacted Rule 24 with the understanding that potential intervenors would
not need to possess Article III standing.186 This evidence, coupled with
the Supreme Court’s approach to standing in Diamond and the purpose
of Article III, indicates that standing should be viewed as a requirement
on the court—not a requirement on the parties.

186. Accordingly, we predict that when the U.S. Supreme Court addresses this issue, it will
hold that Rule 24 intervenors need not possess Article III standing to enter an existing case.
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V. CONCLUSION
Eight circuits are split on whether an intervenor must have standing
before it enters an existing case; we have shown that this split is the result of fundamentally different approaches to the standing doctrine. By
requiring that at least one party in the case possess standing, federal
courts ensure that they only hear “cases” and “controversies.”187 Thus,
standing should be approached as a requirement that every federal court
must ensure is satisfied at all times during a case—not as a requirement
that every party must satisfy before it enters the case. Viewing standing
in this manner is not only consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach
to standing but is also supported by the language and policies of Article
III and Rule 24.188 We encourage all federal courts to approach standing
as a requirement on every federal court and hold that Rule 24 intervenors
need not possess Article III standing to enter an existing case.
Tyler R. Stradling & Doyle S. Byers

187. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
188. It has been suggested that Rule 24 should be amended to clarify whether or not standing
applies to intervenors. See Gardner, supra note 3, at 699–700 (concluding that ideally, the advisory
committee would amend Rule 24 to clarify the issue). However, we conclude that the advisory
committee need not—and indeed should not—enact such an amendment. Congress is ultimately responsible for the language of Rule 24, and it is not the role of Congress to declare that the Constitution does not apply to a particular statute. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
The Eighth Circuit recognized this principle in Mausolf v. Babbitt: “Congress could no more use
Rule 24 to abrogate the Article III standing requirements than it could expand the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction by statute.” 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996). If Congress determined that
intervenors should have standing to enter a case, it would be proper for Congress to amend Rule 24
to require such an interest of intervenors. Such an amendment would not be a declaration of constitutional law but rather a decision of legislative policy.
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